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God for All Time: From Theism to Ultimism 
1. Introduction 
Western philosophy, in its conversations about religion, has been much exercised by the idea of a 
personal God: an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good creator of any world there may be. 
Of course other religious ideas, as well as other versions of this idea, have surfaced from time to 
time. But the God of traditional theism – the God-Who-is-a-Personal-Agent – has dominated. In 
this respect the recent rebirth of philosophy of religion within analytical philosophy is nothing 
new. It’s just an old conversation starting up again. If we are talking about the omnipotent agent 
God in new ways, and with new analytical tools, it’s still the omnipotent agent God we’re talking 
about. Hume, Leibniz, Descartes, Augustine, Aristotle, Plato, Anaxagoras – none of these figures 
would have much difficulty discerning what’s going on should he suddenly be transported into 
the twenty-first century and reanimated in the midst of one of our seminars. (He’d immediately 
join us in arguing about whether God was responsible!) 
Now there are complex historical reasons for this continuity of interest in a personal God. 
The millennia-long influences of western religious traditions, and especially of Christianity, 
would obviously have to be cited, as would the way in which the idea of an omnipotent agent has 
lent itself to explanation in metaphysics. Both factors are much in evidence in western 
philosophy, as we’ve experienced it so far, and appear as well in the work of leading instigators 
of the contemporary “revival” in philosophy of religion such as Richard Swinburne and Alvin 
Plantinga. Some of the historical reasons involved may go much further back. According to the 
youthful field of study known as cognitive science of religion, we are primed by evolution for 
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agent-centered religion. Humans, so we are told, are built in such a way that religious agent 
concepts exert a special appeal (See Barrett 2004, Boyer 2001, Tremlin 2006). This recent work 
waits to be further confirmed, but it certainly enjoys a strong initial plausibility.    
So is the upshot that the agent God, the personal God, has been overemphasized 
philosophically, at least in the west? Certainly there are some philosophers – and maybe we can 
tell by extrapolation from the above why they are not in the majority – who are calling for 
increased attention to alternative conceptions of the Divine. Because of an ambiguity in the word 
‘God’ that I shall be emphasizing, which allows it to range more narrowly or more broadly, 
sometimes the phrase used is ‘alternative conceptions of God.’ Often what these people have in 
mind, or so it appears, is that we should be paying more attention to detailed pantheistic, 
panentheistic, perhaps process theistic views that have been knocked to one side in the rush to 
embrace or attack traditional theism. We need to be talking to Spinoza, Hegel, and Whitehead as 
well as to Descartes, Leibniz, and Hume.  
Others, influenced by the great diversity of the world’s religious life, sensitive to the 
many conflicting details in religious concepts, have argued that we should focus on developing a 
concept of the Divine which puts it quite beyond any of our detailed representations, including 
that of traditional theism, and indeed altogether beyond human thought. Maybe we in the west 
need to be speaking to Pseudo-Dionysius, Meister Eckhart, and al-Arabi too, not to mention all 
the non-western philosophers and religious thinkers who have taught the idea of an ineffable or 
transcategorial Divine. One proposal in particular has captured the attention of contemporary 
analytical philosophers, and that is John Hick’s well known work on the ‘Real.’ (The religious 
application of the term ‘transcategorial’ originates, I believe, with him.) 
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The directions of thought I have just distinguished are, in my view, important and worth 
pursuing. Let many flowers bloom, so say I. But I have my own proposal, and a novel science-
informed rationale for endorsing it. As I see it, the first option mentioned above which advocates 
exploring pantheism, panentheism, and similar ideas in detail, while excellent as far as it goes, in 
an important sense doesn’t go far enough. While it is ready to speak of alternative conceptions of 
God, thus referring more broadly to a Divine reality and not to the theistic personal God or any 
other detailed center of religious life to which the word ‘God’ has been applied, it leaves the 
broader framework idea and the reasons for emphasizing it obscure. The general as opposed to 
specific idea of God – and thus, in that sense, an alternative idea of God – is ironically not itself 
clarified. As for the second, Hickian approach: while admirably motivated, in an important sense 
it goes too far. From detailed conceptions we move outward to a level of vagueness so deep that 
literally nothing can be said about the Divine. Though it might have been otherwise had the flight 
from detail been terminated earlier, and the reasons for increased generality correctly identified, 
no framework is afforded for continuing religious investigation.  
I myself, of course, have the happy Goldilocks position that goes just far enough! Well, 
that is for argument to decide. After sketching a general conception in connection with which we 
might more self-consciously use the word ‘God,’ I shall give my arguments, paying special 
attention to the ways in which, in the new context for discussion I hope to open up, traditional 
theism will, perforce, recede to the secondary status it should always have had.  
 
2. Ultimism 
With concepts come propositions or claims – claims to the effect that those concepts are 
exemplified. And so, as we have already noted, with the idea of a personal God comes the claim 
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of traditional theism (or theism for short). In part because everything I’m doing here amounts to a 
debate with theism, I shall generally be speaking of my depiction of the alternative, more general 
way of thinking about God in terms of the proposition claiming it is realized. This proposition I 
have called ultimism (Schellenberg 2005). Another reason for highlighting the proposition 
ultimism is that although the thought of a more general or basic religious claim has long been, as 
it were, in the air, that claim has oddly never been given a name. Well, now it has a name.  
Or, at least, a name has been given to one way of developing the ultimate proposition, the 
way I shall defend as offering a framework appropriate for religious investigation far into the 
future. On this view, the basic claim religion in the twenty-first century should be seen as calling 
us to consider is that there is a reality ultimate in three ways: metaphysically, axiologically, and 
soteriologically. Immediately we leave behind the vague gesturing of much talk about ultimacy in 
religious studies. But what exactly does my talk imply? 
To see, it may be useful first to step back a bit and say something about another notion: 
that of a transcendent reality. The reality at the heart of many religious lives past and present is 
conceived as transcending – as being something more than or deeper than or greater than – 
mundane reality, where by ‘mundane reality’ or ‘the mundane realm’ I mean (to quote part of an 
earlier discussion of mine that remains relevant) “those aspects of human life and its environment 
to which just any mature human always has quick and natural cognitive and experiential access, 
what might (in two senses) be called the common elements of human life, which all who eat, 
drink, sleep, play, think, relate, and so on, will explicitly know and regularly encounter” 
(Schellenberg 2005, p. 11). Now the transcendent reality of religion is certainly something 
‘more’ than mundane in factual terms, but if that’s all there is to be said about it, it might very 
well turn out to be something discoverable by science and completely at home in a secular 
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picture of the world. As so many examples suggest, what the religious have in mind is also 
something ‘more’ in value and in what we might term importance, by which I mean its value for 
us – for human life. The first, purely factual sort of transcendence we may call metaphysical 
transcendence, the second is axiological transcendence, and the third soteriological transcendence 
(I use the term ‘soteriological’ advisedly, recognizing that it is often employed in contexts 
narrower than mine). It is by embracing these three together rather than the first alone, so I 
suggest, that religiousness is instantiated. 
Let’s explain a bit further these three kinds of transcendence. To say that something is 
metaphysically transcendent is to say that its existence is a fact distinct from any mundane fact 
and in some way a more fundamental fact about reality than any mundane fact (more 
fundamental in a broadly causal and explanatorily relevant sense). To say that something is 
axiologically transcendent is to say that its intrinsic value – its splendour, its excellence – 
exceeds that of anything found in mundane reality alone. And to say that something is 
soteriologically transcendent is to say that being rightly related to it will make for more well-
being, fulfilment, wholeness, and the like for creatures than can be attained at the mundane level 
alone (this leaves open the possibility that spiritual well-being might in some way be attainable 
through mundane things). The different realities believed by practitioners to be at the heart of 
Jewish, Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Taoist practice certainly appear to be regarded 
as ‘more’ in all three of these ways (and the same goes for other forms of religion as different 
from one another as North American aboriginal and ancient Greek); they are regarded as 
transcendent not just metaphysically, but also axiologically and soteriologically. I call this 
complex property triple transcendence.
i
  
Of course, as already suggested, the various religious traditions of the world typically 
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don’t let the matter rest here – they have much more to say about how the ‘more’ of 
transcendence is to be construed. Details are added to the basic content of triple transcendence. 
And so we hear of the nonpersonal world-soul Brahman, or of the Buddha-nature, or of a 
personal God or gods (perhaps many gods or a God that is Three-in-One). The religious 
traditions differ in the sort of detail and also in how much detail they offer us. But they also differ 
along another dimension, which I shall be emphasizing, and this is a dimension I call strength. A 
strong concept of the Divine says or implies that the Divine is not just transcendent; it is ultimate, 
and ultimate in all three of the ways we have distinguished: metaphysically, axiologically, and 
soteriologically. A strong concept, in other words, takes us from triple transcendence to triple 
ultimacy, in effect endorsing the content of ultimism.
ii
  
Before explaining a little further how the three kinds of ultimacy are to be conceived, let 
me record my impression that the word ‘God’ is typically used in connection with views 
elaborating them. I venture to surmise that it is an apparent connection to ultimacy that elicits use 
of the word ‘God’ and that the perhaps inchoate tendency of, for example, traditional theists and 
monistic Hindus to to regard the reality central to their religious practices as ultimate is a 
necessary condition of their inclination to call it God. Perhaps lesser realities, even if triply 
transcendent, would not be seen as deserving the label. But, if so, then it is natural indeed to say 
of the bare concept of triple ultimacy, without elaboration, that what it refers to is appropriately 
called God. We can, in other words, use the word ‘God’ both more narrowly and more broadly. 
(As noted earlier, the possibility of doing so is indicated even by the expression ‘alternative 
conceptions of God.’) In any case, with my emphasis in this paper on bare or simple or generic or 
unelaborated ultimism instead of on theism or any other detailed religious claim, I can be seen as 
recommending that we tear our eyes away from the word’s more specific contexts of usage and 
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think about how it might more consciously and explicitly – and more often – be applied quite 
generally in this way. 
Let’s look more closely now at what ultimism should be seen as holding to be the case 
(and when using the word in this way I shall always mean unelaborated ultimism). What is 
metaphysical ultimacy? axiological ultimacy? soteriological ultimacy? Here I am torn between a 
desire to work, in each case, toward a clear notion through analysis and a sense of the need to 
leave room for various analyses; perhaps only if we recognize the latter need can ultimism be for 
us a proper framework proposition, stimulating much creative religious exploration that we may 
have occasion to value even millennia hence. Striving for a proper balance, let me offer a few 
remarks.     
Metaphysical ultimacy, in line with what was said earlier about metaphysical 
transcendence, I see as involving the property of fundamentally determining what exists and why 
it exists as it does, a property that for those with interests in what and why will therefore be 
relevant explanatorily: something is metaphysically ultimate in the sense embraced by ultimism 
just in case its existence is the ultimate or most fundamental fact about the nature of things, in 
terms of which any other fact about what things exist and how they exist would have to be 
explained in a correct and comprehensive account of things. Plato, in speaking of the form of the 
Good, and metaphysically naturalistic scientists in speaking of the elusive Theory of Everything, 
seem both to have in mind something bearing metaphysical ultimacy in this sense. Religious 
people whose conception of the Divine is metaphysically ultimistic have it in mind too.  
What else do they have in mind, at the metaphysical level? Well, I suspect this varies, and 
we should allow it to vary – remaining open to exploring many possibilities. As soon as we say 
more we are already elaborating the basic idea of metaphysical ultimacy at the heart of ultimism. 
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It might, for example, seem appealing to follow up on some interesting suggestions about the 
idea of an ultimate reality made by Robert Nozick (1989, p. 200). Nozick distinguishes several 
senses of this notion; the labels are mine but the descriptions are his: compositional (“the ground-
floor stuff out of which everything is composed”), explanatory (“the fundamental explanatory 
level which explains all current happenings”), generative (“the factor out of which everything 
else originated”), and teleological (“the goal toward which everything develops”). The second of 
these seems a weaker version of what I’ve already set out in the previous paragraph, and entailed 
by it. The others – including the fourth (which also suggests a move beyond the metaphysical) – 
could all be explored as indicating some of the ways in which metaphysical ultimacy in my 
minimal sense might be realized. Perhaps they are even compatible; there are conceivable 
religious elaborations of metaphysical ultimacy that argue as much. (Perhaps an ‘emanationist’ 
model that pictured the embodiment of the Divine by the rest of reality deepened and enriched 
over time would allow for generative ultimacy to also be compositional and teleological.)  
But ultimism, as I understand it, entails none of these things. Given such elaborations, the 
possibility of conflict among alternative conceptions of the metaphysical dimension of God or 
the Divine, and between such conceptions and metaphysical naturalism, already emerges. A 
naturalism which holds that the universe is infinite in past time, for example, will say there is no 
generative ultimate. And theism will say there is no compositional ultimate, since you and I and 
the Person Who Is God aren’t composed of the same ‘stuff.’ Ultimism, as I am presenting it, 
avoids such potential conflicts; it entails a metaphysical component at once broad enough for 
many within religion and without to endorse it and precise enough to provide a framework for 
further inquiry.  
What about axiological ultimacy? Here again we have an intensification – a totalizing or 
 
 
9
ultimizing – of what was said earlier about the relevant aspect of transcendence. If axiological 
transcendence is excellence and splendor surpassing anything in mundane reality, then 
axiological ultimacy is completely unsurpassable splendor and excellence. Here the famous 
Anselmian idea – which ironically is linked only to the broader sense of ‘God’ not exclusive to 
theism – might profitably be contemplated: the idea of something-than-which-a-greater cannot-
be-thought. This is axiological ultimacy, as I have built it into ultimism. Something is 
axiologically ultimate just in case it is ultimate in value – the greatest possible reality.  
Some might be tempted to assume that I have in mind, when speaking of axiological 
ultimacy, some claim to the effect that the existence of the Ultimate is the foundation for ethics 
or value theory or some such thing. Perhaps the friends of Euthyphro should rejoice! But no, this 
is not the case. Of course, there are conceivable elaborations of axiological ultimacy that run in 
this direction, but nothing of the sort is entailed by it. The Divine could be unsurpassably great 
even if the ‘foundations’ for ethics and value theory, if such there be, allowed for a fully secular 
appreciation – for example, by consisting of necessary truths concerning value.       
Notice here that we are talking not only about something that exceeds in intrinsic value 
anything else in the actual world. By saying it is unsurpassable I mean to imply that it cannot be 
surpassed, in any possible world. This seems required in order to take account of ultimizing or 
totalizing attitudes as we find them in religion, such as attitudes of worship, which recognize no 
limit of any kind to the greatness of the Divine. Out of the corner of my mind, as it were, I am 
also glancing at the future and thinking of the sort of framework proposition we might profitably 
pass along to the generations that will follow us (more on this in the next section).  
Notice, also, that by moving on from metaphysical to axiological ultimacy in the 
construction of ultimism, we move past anything that might nonreligiously be endorsed. Some 
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naturalists may demur, thinking that Nature or the most explanatorily basic fact about nature 
might be unsurpassably great. But in making this observation, I suggest, they are in effect 
observing a way of stepping from naturalism (at least from any naturalism defined in relation to 
twenty-first century empirical science) into a form of pantheism – which is one way in which the 
religious idea of ultimism might be elaborated.  
Adding soteriological ultimacy to our picture of the Divine ensconces us all the more 
firmly in religious territory. For the ultimist, it’s not just some greater good than can be found at 
the mundane level per se that is attainable in relation to the Ultimate, but the very greatest good 
that can be embodied in creaturely living – our deepest good (thus we are still talking about 
value, but not – at least not more than indirectly – about the intrinsic greatness of the Divine). 
Earlier I characterized this as a good for us. This expression invites discussion of the extension of 
‘us’ – what is included in its range? Over time we have seen some movement, in the religious 
traditions of the world, toward a universal concern, and today one often hears religious people 
speaking of the good of the whole world as something they are actively seeking. Should we build 
such a universal attainability of wholeness or fulfilment or salvation into our understanding of 
soteriological ultimacy?   
Here we need to distinguish two levels of ‘attainable good.’ First, soteriological ultimacy 
might be thought to involve a good attainable by the religious practitioner. Religion in the 
personal sense of religiousness that most concerns me involves a practice. And part of what 
makes a conception of the Ultimate religious, so it seems, is a certain view as to how this reality 
is related to such a practice. The short answer: soteriologically. On this view, anyone who takes 
up religious practice is thereby put in a position to attain his or her deepest good.  
Having noted this, we can also move to a second level, discussing how widely beneficial 
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states of affairs will – at least eventually – be distributed in the world, if ultimism is true. 
Certainly it is natural to imagine the value of the Ultimate communicated through religious 
practitioners, and perhaps also in many other ways, to all the world. It is tempting to say that 
nothing less than a consummation of things in which all the world tastes the goodness of the 
Divine could be worthy of ultimism. But I am content to leave open various possible 
interpretations, by altogether avoiding in my definition a reference to us: a reality is 
soteriologically ultimate just in case in relation to it an ultimate good can be attained.  
So we have before us my depiction of what might be called the alternative, more general 
concept of God – though of course the word ‘alternative’ is used here in a sense that allows many 
more detailed pictures of the Divine to be compatible with my own, even if they are incompatible 
with (and thus logically alternatives to) each other. According to ultimism’s spare vision there is 
a reality triply ultimate: metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically. Ultimism, as can be 
seen, is actually logically equivalent to a large disjunction of propositions – all those more 
detailed religious claims that entail ultimism. Theism would be thought to entail ultimism, and 
the same goes for various other detailed religious ideas, including pantheism as usually 
described. But ultimism entails none of these propositions. By claiming that ultimism is true 
(which claim is perhaps still more than our short evolutionary history will easily sustain), any 
religious believer who embraces this proposition is in one sense, perhaps the deepest, certainly 
the broadest, claiming that God exists. But she is at the same time recognizing, admitting, 
perhaps even exulting in the many alternative conceptions of God – this God – that our species 
may hardly yet have begun to explore.  
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3. Temporalism 
And with that tantalizing thought I move from a summary of our results so far to a suggestion of 
new ones to be gleaned in the present section of the paper and in the one to follow. The central 
new idea is that there is a reason related to the scientific discovery of deep time that will support 
‘going general’ in our thinking about God. Both in philosophy and in religion there is a striking 
tendency to forget our very early stage of evolutionary development as a species (and I have in 
mind both biological and cultural evolution). I have recently been seeking to remind us of this, 
and the position I am defending in doing so, which emphasizes our place in time and the 
importance of bending our thought accordingly, I call temporalism.  
Temporalism tells us that the transition from human timescales involving months, years, 
or centuries to scientific timescales is still quite incomplete. Now it may be thought that we are 
actually becoming quite familiar with deep time: aren’t evolutionary studies, for example, all the 
rage? But what we’ve been getting used to is really just one side of the story, which concerns the 
deep past. The rest of the story concerns the deep future and where we are located between those 
two – between deep past and deep future. We need to notice our place in time, wedged between 
perhaps 50,000 years on one side, the short inter-glacial period in which behaviourally modern 
humans have arisen, and another billion or so on the other – life’s potential future on our planet. 
And we need to reflect carefully on this Great Disparity, seriously considering the changes in 
religiously-relevant thought and feeling that Earth may see in so much time, whether in our 
species or others that may follow.  
These neglected scientific facts and cultural possibilities are relevant to how we should 
think about God. The alternative construals of a transcendent Divine reality that we’ve dug up so 
far, when considered in scientific perspective, will be seen to be such as may mark only a bare 
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beginning of religious investigation. Because of the very early stage of intelligent development 
that Homo sapiens – certainly as we know it today – is in, we have to admit that there may be 
many ways of adding detail to ultimism that we haven’t yet conceived, perhaps including ones 
we are presently quite unable to conceive. Maybe it will take a great deal longer for intelligence 
and spiritual sensitivity to mature to the point where religious discoveries could be made. This 
state of affairs is epistemically possible, by which I mean that we have no way justifiedly to rule 
it out (for more on the relevant epistemological issues see Schellenberg 2013).  
From the perspective temporalism opens up to us, it must seem rash and premature to pin 
our religious hopes on any very detailed religious proposition. For our descendants may uncover 
religious ideas or undergo religious experiences far more impressive than any that life on Earth 
has seen so far. How then should we think about God? In a word: generally. Our best chance at 
working, in this intellectually ambitious territory, with ideas possessing what I will call temporal 
stability – ideas that even more deeply enlightened descendants of ours existing in the far future, 
if such there should ever be, would find valuable – is to go general. While the door to truth in 
religion remains open, the best thing we can do, intellectually and spiritually, is to stretch our 
minds as far as we can along spiritual dimensions apparently already available to us. And this, I 
suggest, means focusing on the triple ultimacy central to ultimism – the biggest and arguably the 
most interesting idea that religion has yet delivered. (I, of course, am not responsible for 
producing this idea. It has been with us for thousands of years. All I am doing is drawing 
attention to it, pushing aside the weeds of thought that have obscured it from our eyes.)   
Recall the disjunction to which ultimism is logically equivalent. We have no idea how big 
that disjunction is and whether it may not include religious disjuncts that far surpass in power 
and illumination any large-scale explanatory idea yet conceived by human beings. But what we 
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can do is emphasize the disjunction and work at getting a better sense of the disjuncts it may 
contain. Our idea of God needs to be a framework idea, whose extant fillings we must indeed 
continue to explore, as one of the approaches mentioned at the beginning of this paper would 
have it, but which we should regard as capable of being filled out in many new ways as well – 
ways that a few thousand years of stumbling around in the dark, out of the millions more that 
may be friendly to intelligent life on our planet, have perhaps not been sufficient to reveal.  
This is the surprising perspective on God that, in my view, science supports. It is a 
perspective that, as I’ve begun to suggest, will not support the continuing dominance of theism in 
the philosophy of religion. But there are other troubling temporalist implications for theism to be 
explored, as I want now to show.  
 
4. The Evolutionary Ontological Argument 
The title of this section is, I confess, a bit of a tease. I have no evolutionary proof of Anselm’s 
idea. But I do have something like an evolutionary argument for favouring that ultimistic idea 
over the idea of theism, with which it is so often conflated. In fact, one half of the argument has 
already been given, for we have seen that concerns about temporal stability – the stability of our 
most ambitious ideas over what may be enormously long periods of cultural and genetic 
evolution – warrant our focusing on something very like the general idea Anselm’s ontological 
argument sought to establish as true, and considering many ways of filling it out other than 
theism. But there is another concern too, which I call a concern about spiritual authenticity.
iii
  
The central idea here is that in the light of ultimism, clearer than any cast by its 
elaborations, theism may appear less impressive than we would like an idea of the Ultimate to be. 
Add to this the temporalist insight that we could easily mistake an imposter for the genuine 
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article at so early a stage of evolutionary development, and we may find ourselves wondering 
whether theism really does entail ultimism. Its advocates would surely suppose it to do so. The 
evolutionary ontological argument is completed by the considerations that undermine this 
supposition.   
The idea of a personal God is, for any sensitive human being who sees it in the light it 
can compel, with the weeds of thought that obscure the vision of many contemporary atheists 
brushed aside, a deeply affecting one. The greatest possible person would be a great thing indeed. 
Beginning from our own experiences of power, knowledge, and goodness and extrapolating to 
ultimate versions thereof, recognizing that we could never fully embrace in thought the result of 
doing so, noting also that there may be facets of Godly greatness compatible with those just 
mentioned of which we can form no conception, we may think the theistic idea of God to be 
ultimate – ultimate among religious ideas. Imagining what it would be like to grow ever deeper 
into knowledge by acquaintance of such a being’s nature, striving to appreciate what must be the 
limitless subtleties and nuances of a personal relationship with the personal God, we may be 
unable to imagine anything that could be better – more saving – for vulnerable finite lives like 
our own.   
And yet.... And yet it is significant that everything I have just described falls within the 
parameters of the concept of a person, with the attributes of personhood determined by what we 
and the rest of our species have experienced thus far in our own very short career as persons. 
Could an ultimate reality be thus narrowly confined? “The concept of God,” Peter van Inwagen 
writes in his recent Gifford lectures, is not just “the concept of a greatest possible person.” It is 
“the concept of a person who is the greatest possible being.” (2006, p. 158). But could a person, 
with personhood understood by reference to us, be the greatest possible being? Perhaps 
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personhood as known by us is the thin edge of a wedge that thickens indefinitely, with the reality 
of the thicker parts in some way embracing strands of what we know but also transcending them 
to such an extent as to be quite unrecognizable by us. Perhaps, alternatively, something like 
Spinoza’s idea is correct and mind and matter – the modes of being with which we are 
acquainted – are but two of an infinite number of dimensions or modes of Divinity (for more on 
such possibilities see Schellenberg 2007). Who can say? We are of course ready to be content 
with the idea of a Divine Person. With the hymn writer I may imagine that “He walks with me 
and He talks with me, and He tells me I am His own,” feeling that this is quite enough. But is it 
enough for triple ultimacy?  
Especially given a temporalist perspective, there is reason to be in doubt – skeptical – as 
to whether it is. It could be that theism represents no more than an early attempt to fill out the 
Divine idea, one that in a future potentially twenty thousand times as long as our past, reflective 
and spiritually sensitive intelligence on our planet will surpass many times over. Now 
extrapolating from our experience as persons, when developing religious ideas, is of course quite 
natural for us – if the cognitive science of religion is right, then it is natural indeed! But it may 
also lead us to become obsessed with religious ideas that fall far short of what we might yet 
encounter in the way of religious illumination, over periods of time we can hardly conceive, 
through much openminded and openhearted investigation. All in all, even our best and fullest 
experience of personhood is a slender reed on which to hang a conception of the Ultimate. 
Notice that the issue here isn’t whether we should be in doubt as to whether theism is 
true. I have argued elsewhere that at least so much is justified by evolutionary considerations 
(Schellenberg 2009, 2013); but that is not my concern at the moment. The issue is whether 
theism offers a contender for the status of ultimacy in the first place. Unless it does so, it can 
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hardly hope to retain a central place in our investigations in philosophy of religion as we take the 
idea of religious ultimacy from the past into the future. Now, of course, one could tack on at the 
end of the traditional theistic proposition with its omni-attributes the following addition: “and 
this being is metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate.” That would quite 
trivially make of theism an ultimacy claim. But nothing is accomplished through such sleight of 
hand. For now we do find ourselves wondering whether theism is true because we wonder 
whether the content coming before the tacked-on bit entails it. Indeed, the two sorts of doubt I 
have distinguished now coincide. 
Notice how different things must be if instead of theism we make ultimism central. 
Ultimism’s spiritual authenticity can hardly be challenged, since it provides the standard by 
which to assess claims as authentic, spiritually, or not. So long as this more general idea of God 
was left obscure, theism could stand unchallenged. But with ultimism clarified, we are able to 
compare the two propositions. We are able, furthermore, to see that theism should entail 
ultimism, if the hopes for it cherished by many philosophers of religion are well grounded. And 
we can see that it’s not at all clear that it does entail ultimism. Moreover, with an investigative 
orientation tempered by temporalism, we can see that there are good reasons, at so early a stage 
of evolutionary development, to beware of premature commitment to what could be misleading 
details and indeed to look for something much more general like ultimism to guide the much 
more thoroughgoing efforts in religious investigation that are needed.   
Things should be different indeed in philosophy of religion when all of this is absorbed. 
 
5. Ultimism and ‘the Real’ 
I have argued that the general idea of God represented by ultimism should become central in 
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philosophy of religion, and that the alternative ways of filling out that idea – and in particular the 
one offered by theism – should be regarded as having, at best, a secondary status. On temporalist 
grounds we can see that the general concept should be the preferred alternative, when the 
question is whether to go general or specific in our thinking about God. And, having settled that, 
and having clarified the general idea, we now have a decent framework for discussing many 
alternative conceptions of God – that is to say many different ways of attempting to fill out that 
general picture, including any renewed attempts made by theists – as we move into the future.  
How does all this relate to the second way of seeking to get past an overemphasis on the 
personal God mentioned at the beginning of this paper – the Hickian approach? If we can now 
see that the first approach does not go far enough, because it leaves the general idea of God and 
the reasons for emphasizing it unclear, can we by the same token see how the second approach, 
as I earlier suggested, goes too far?  
I think we can, and in this final section of the paper, I want to show how. John Hick’s 
efforts to revive a transcategorial, ineffabilist picture of the Divine in the midst of twentieth-
century analytical philosophy of religion are strikingly bold and bracing. Much can be learned 
from Hick’s work, and his sensitivity to the facts of religious diversity – which, together with a 
Kantian strain of thought, form the basis for his approach – is exemplary. But the Hickian 
concept of the ‘Real,’ a Divine reality that “in itself is not and cannot be humanly experienced” 
(Hick 1989, p. 249) and whose positive, nonformal properties we could not possibly grasp, 
leaves something to be desired. Though one can, as Hick points out, find examples of ineffabilist 
talk about the Divine in many different religious traditions, one wonders why it isn’t to be 
regarded as being what Hick himself took incarnational language about Jesus to be in another 
context: “hyperbole of the heart” (Hick 1977, p. 183). That nothing can be said of the Divine, 
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that it merits silence alone, and so on – these are the sorts of things religious people say when 
stunned by the apparent greatness of God in certain kinds of religious experience. And this is a 
positive quality. Sure, it may be that no detailed picture religion has yet produced can do it 
justice, but then why not retreat to talking of such greatness alone, as does ultimism? For reasons 
such as this, one wonders whether Hick, in picking up the ineffability idea and running with it, 
hasn’t gone too far. Why isn’t ultimism far enough?   
Notice that ultimism, unlike the concept of the ‘Real’, is not insensitive to real-world 
aspirations to gain some understanding of the Divine. Instead, it provides a framework within 
which we may seek to fulfil them. And most of the positive things that the various religious 
traditions of the world have wanted to say about the Divine can be investigated within its 
parameters: the facts of religious diversity are fully – certainly more fully – accommodated. Hick 
appears to go further than his own sensitivity to religious diversity might have been expected to 
take him.  
Now perhaps such investigative ambitions would be shown to be completely unrealistic if 
Hick’s application of the Kantian distinction between phenomenal and noumenal reality stood up 
to scrutiny. We have seen how experiences of Divine greatness and the facts of religious 
diversity are admirably accommodated by ultimism. But if this third reason of Hick’s had any 
weight, we might judge that even ultimism could not literally be true.  
Unfortunately the Kantian move has been powerfully criticized – for example, in 
Plantinga (2000). And now let me add my own criticism, grounded in temporalism. The Kantian 
theory, bearing such properties as precision, detail, and profundity, not to mention ambition and 
controversiality, is made subject to a temporalist sort of skepticism (elsewhere I have called it 
evolutionary skepticism: see Schellenberg 2013). Though the theory might be true, and certainly 
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is worth examining further, it cannot command our belief at so early a stage of philosophical 
investigation, with so many profound alternatives possibly waiting to be explored.  
Independently of these specific considerations, we might already have wondered how 
there is any way to tell, given our place in time, that positive religious insights are simply closed 
off to us, behind a Kantian Wall, instead of waiting for us – or for species that may follow us – in 
the future. With a proper appreciation of deep time and in the context of thinking about cultural 
and biological evolution we can see that skepticism about our mental capabilities has to be a 
double-edged sword: we should be in doubt about many of our most ambitious results of the 
present, but in doubt as well about the claim that we will never do much better. To put this more 
positively: temporalist epistemological pessimism is united with a certain optimism – these two 
come in the same package. Not having taken account of temporalist insights, Hick offers us 
pessimism alone. And thus he goes too far.   
The temporalist answer to Hick – and also to the traditional theist Plantinga, as we saw in 
the previous section, and to anyone else focused exclusively on a detailed conception of God – is 
one that we are only starting to appreciate. What it shows is that there is a reason for ‘going 
general’ in matters religious stemming from our evolutionary immaturity. We need to think about 
religion in a manner that allows us to be part of a trans-generational process of inquiry – a long 
process weaving its way through deep time that we who recognize our evolutionarily immaturity 
must imagine to be unfolding in order to give life and hope to our present inquiries. In this 
context it must, to say the least, appear short-sighted to make a detailed proposition like theism, 
so tied to our past and present experience, central to philosophy of religion. We don’t need a God 
from our time or for our time alone. We need a God for all time. Better than any alternative, this 
is what ultimism provides.   
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Notes 
                                                 
i.The use of the word ‘transcendence’ that is relevant here is easily conflated with another found 
in religion, which focuses on a qualitative feature or features of certain elevated human 
experiences. Now technically the latter could satisfy my description of triple transcendence, but 
usually the ‘reality’ central to religion is regarded as being more than an experience. Of course, 
even when this is so, the former may be closely related to the latter. Perhaps especially in a 
soteriological context one might be moved to speak of experiences of transcendence as attending 
a right relationship to the transcendent Divine.  
ii.Of course, it may do so – and a similar observation applies to the other ideas I have mentioned, 
such as the idea of transcendence – without any religious person ever employing the word 
‘ultimism’ or ‘ultimate.’ The religious concepts with which we operate and the words we use to 
speak of them, if we ever do, are distinct matters.   
iii.I first gestured at these two concerns in Schellenberg 2009, chap. 1. 
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